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Judicial Control of the Missouri Public
Service Commission
By
JAMES

W.

SIMONTON.*

Introduction
The control of the relations between the public and the various
public service commissions or boards is now quite general throughout the country. The movement started during the last third of the
nineteenth century with the formation of the various railroad
boards and railroad commissions, to which were usually given
certain powers of control over relations between the public and the
railroads. But the courts, under the influence of the extreme
individualistic notions of the time, were so hostile to any exercise of
any real power by such administrative boards that these boards
were almost completely paralyzed, and, as one might say, their
morale was destroyed, so that as a rule they refrained from any
action which would be likely to be taken into the courts for review.'
When one reads over the provisions of some of these acts today, one
is suprised at the extent of the powers which were apparently granted to some of the commissions, though of course they are not nearly
so great as the powers granted by the various acts establishing
public service commissions since 1906. But after thz passage of
the Federal Interstate Commerce Act state courts apparently
tended to a less hostile attitude, and about 1907 began a series of
enactments in various states which gave drastic powers to such
commissions, and under which they began to operate with effect.'
*This article is the thesis written by Mr. Simonton in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of S. J. D. at Harvard Law
School.
1. Smalley, Railroad Rate Control, 125.
2. Acts were passed in New York and Wisconsin in 1906.
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In Missouri an act was passed establishing a railroad commission as early as 1875, 3 which persisted under the name of "Railroad
and Warehouse Commission" until the passage of the present
Public Service Commission Act in 1913. 4 This older commission,
however, never seemed to have attempted a vigorous exercise of the
limited powers conferred upon it and it seemed to have occasioned
the judiciary very little concern. No body of law ever developed
under it, such as is now so rapidly growing up under the present act
and Commission created by it.
It is the purpose of this paper to discuss the judicial control
exercised over the present Public Service Commission of Missouri,
hereafter for convenience called the Commission, by the supreme
court of the state, for since this court has the final word as to the
construction of the act creating the Commission and under which it
operates, the bounds within which the Commission will be left
free to accomplish the designs of its creators, must in the end be
largely determined by the decisions of this court.
Missouri did not follow the prevailing fashion of entrusting the
control of the relations between the public and its public utilities to
an administrative commission until 1913. By this time this sort
of scheme of control had been successfully operated in sister states
and it was past the experimental stage. At the time the act was
passed it was popularly regarded as a law that would result in early
benefit to the public in the form of reduced rates, for utility rates
are always popularly regarded as exhorbitant. That the Commission would, within the first few years of its existence, stand between
many of the utilities and financial ruin was not anticipated. The
war came on with its attendant steady increase in prices, and after
3.

See Laws of 1875, 112-119. This act with its subsequent amendments was abolished by the Public Service Commission Act in
1913. At first the board established was called the Railroad Commission but by a later amendment it was known as the Railroad
and Warehouse Commission.

4.

Laws of Missouri, 1913, 556-651. This act is found in its present
form in R. S. 1919, sections 10410-10550, except for minor amendments which will be found in Laws of 1921, 583-5 and Laws of
1923, 330-331.
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a time many utilities were in great financial distress because they
could not meet the constantly increasing costs withcut increased
rates. It was necessary to increase rates and the Commission reluctantly granted increases from time to time. Decreases became a
thing of the past, and the public found that after nearly every
hearing the utility concerned was granted an increase. It thus became evident the act was favoring the soulless corporation instead
of making the way of the sovereign people smooth. The situation
which arose is well expressed in a recent report of the Commission: 6
"A storm of opposition arose against the Public Service Commission. The public was suspicious. In many instances this. suspicion instead of being allayed by public officials who had appeared before the
Commission in opposition to the application for increases, and who knew
the facts, was intensified by the statements of such officials made at
such hearings. These statements were not made as uncontra dicted facts,
but were made in the trial of a case with a view of preventing the Commission from increasing the rates further than was absolutely necessary.
However, they were accepted by the public as uncontradicted facts.
"The Commissions of all the states of the union faced this situation
with courage and determination. Not a single state commission was able
to pass through the period of high prices without increasirg utility rates
all along the line. They were compelled to do so to save many of the
utilities from bankruptcy and receiverships and to save i:he service for
the public."
Happily the Commission has now come through this period
and is now able to show an increasing list of decreases granted, and
it may even appeal to the popular mind in the years to come as
5.

6.

"While the primary duty of a commission is to protect the public,
yet the Constitution of the United States and of the: several states
as well as the statutes creating the commission cast: another duty
upon them, and that is to exercise these powers of- regulation in
such a manner as not to confiscate the property ofthie utility or to
unjustly or unfairly interfere with the use of private property. In
short the law contemplates that regulation must be done with due
regard for the just and legal rights of all parties, whether it be the
consumer or the utility." 9th and 10th Annual Report of the P. S.
C. of Mo. (1921, 1922) 2-3.
9th and 10th Rep. of the P. S. C. of Mo. 5. This report contains
some interesting tables showing what happened in the state during
the period of rising costs.
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accomplishing to a considerable degree what the populace considers
its purpose, namely, to act as a regulator of these monopolies in
the interest of the pocket books of the people.
After the passage of the Public Service Commission Act in
1913, hereafter for convenience called the Act, the first Commission
was appointed and at once organized for business. It apparently
received a warm, if not a friendly welcome from both the public
utilities and from their customers, for soon began the constant
stream of appeals and reviews of orders of the Commission in the
courts of the state which has continued with unabated vigor to the
present time, to say nothing of the more or less successful attempts

to injoin the enforcement of orders of the Commission in the Federal Courts.' One is impressed with the fact that the orders the
Commission has seen fit to enter, usually have not suited either
side of the respective controversies, and displeasure has been manifested by frequent appeals and even in one case by flat defiance of

such orders until obedience was actually compelled by decree of
court.' Such defiance did not prove effective, for the courts of the
state have stood behind the Commission, making such action both
costly and useless. The dissatisfaction is probably complimentary
to the efficiency with which the Commission has performed its
duties. At any rate one can say that indolence has not been one of
its faults.
Nature of the Commission and Its Jurisdictionin General.
The Commission is composed of five members who are appointed by the Governor for terms of six years each. The first Commission was composed of one railroad expert, one electrical engineer
and three lawyers. On the resignation of the railroad expert a little
over two years later, a lawyer was appointed in his place, and
the Commission has ever since been made up of four lawyers and
one civil or electrical engineer. This assures the state of a body ot
7.
8.

Over sixty cases have been decided in the state and federal courts
since 1914, and a considerable number are now pending.
See City Water Company of Sedalia v. City of Sedalia (1921) 288 Mo.
411, 231 S. W. 941
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men trained to look at matters from all sides and most of them
judicially trained as well. As to those matters which are hotly controverted the Commission much resembles a court in action, and in
fact it is a court in all but name, as an examination of the Public
Service Commission Reports will indicate.9 A study of this Commission convinces one that it now has progressed far in building up
a system of rules and regulations, based on the expe:ience of the
past, and that it operates much like a court though it, proceedings
are much more informal in all respects. Some of its hearings are in
effect court proceedings though the body itself the Sux'reme Court
declares is merely an administrative body with no judicial powers
whatever. As to the latter we will refer on various occasions subsequently.
The Commission is required by the Act to maintain an office
at the state capitol at Jefferson City, which shall be open for business throughout the year.' Its powers, and duties are set out with
considerable detail throughout the Act, so extensively so, that it
will be inadvisable to attempt a complete summary of them here.
The Commission is given exclusive control of the relations between
the public and the public utilities operating within the state,
particularly as to the service furnished and the rates charged by
such utilities. The vague term "public utility" is dfined in the
Act to include all railroads, street railroads and other common
carriers; all telephone and telegraph companies; all gas, electric,
water and heating concerns, with certain exceptions as to municipally owned plants furnishing service within their own boundaries."
9.

These reports now include more than a dozen volume3, and some of
the opinions would do credit to the Supreme Court itself. The
subject matter often differs from that found in our law reports, but
when there is occasion, the opinion of the Commission discusses the
decisions of the courts of its own state as well as those of other
states and applies the law in a judicial manner. There is a distinct
tendency to follow its own decisions and various court decisions as
precedents.
10. R.S. 1919, s. 10420.
11. See R. S. 1919, s. 10411, particularly subsection 25. The exception
as to municipally owned plants was added by an amendment made
in 1917. Laws of 1917, 433. The Commission regards this as an
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The Act applies whether the utility is conducted by a person,
partnership or corporation, or whether it is operated under a
lease or by the owner. But the Act defines what shall be included in
the term "public utility" and gives the Commission no power to
declare other businesses to be public utilities and thus bring them
within its jurisdiction. 2 If in the future new businesses come to be
regarded as public utilities, the difficulty will have to be met by
amendment to the Act. As the Act now stands, one may fairly say
the jurisdiction of the Commission extends to all those businesses,
which commonly fall within the current conception of the term
public utility.
The Commission may on its own motion make all sorts of investigations into the service furnished by utilities and into the
equipment and operation of such utilities, or it may proceed on
complaint of one or more of the utilities themselves or on the complaint of their customers. In short the evident purpose of the
Act was to place within the exclusive control of the Commission, so
far as the Legislature was able to do so, the whole troublesome
matter of the relations between the public utilities and the public
which they serve.
While the notion as to what is a public utility is fairly definite
and thus the general field of the jurisdiction of the Commission
under the Act is fairly easy to define, yet on the border it may not
always be easy to draw the line. The Act contains a legislative
direction that it is to be liberally construed so as to effectuate its
purposes.1 4 In determining what is a public utility within its control, the Commission has attempted to assume jurisdiction of a
voluntary telephone company and of the electric plant of a brewery, which was selling its surplus current to certain residences
nearby.
amendment tending to cripple the act. See 7th and 8th Ann. Rep
12.

(1919-1920) 16.
See R. S. 1919, ss. 10411, 10425.

13.
14.

R. S. 1919, ss. 10456, 10491, 10501.
The provisions of this chapter shall be
R. S. 1919, s. 10538 ......
liberally construed with a view to the public welfare, efficient

facilities and substantial justice between patrons and public
utilities."
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In the first case the voluntary telephone company sought to
compel another telephone company to permit connections and to
furnish long distance service under section 93 (3) of the Act which
gave the Commission power to compel physical connection between
two or more companies where such connection could be reasonably
made and where it appeared that "public convenience and necessity will be subserved thereby". But the Supreme Court held that
since section 17, subdiv. 2 of the Act gave the Commission jurisdiction only over those companies "affording telephone communication for hire" and was therefore limited to "those which engage in
business as a commercial transaction, or for profit", that under section 93 (3) there was no power to compel a public telephone company to permit connection with such a private company as the
complaining company.' 5 In other words while the company might
be compelled to furnish long distance service to regular subscribers,
this voluntary company was not such a subscriber, nor was it a
public utility, and hence not within the jurisdiction of the Commission at all. If it were a public utility within the Act fien the Commission would have had power to regulate its rates and to compel it
to furnish service to the public generally.
In the second case a brewing company was selling electric
current to about thirty residences, the connections being made at
the request of the residents and as a favor to them. The local editor
was one of them, and when he began to advocate prohibition, his
service was cut off, hence the complaint. The Commission ordered
the service continued, but the Supreme Court reversed the order on
the ground the brewing company was not a public utility. 6
The decision was clearly right for certainly the Act did not intend
to prevent one from selling surplus current unless he made the
15.

Buffum Telephone Company v. P. S. C. (1917) 272 Mo. 627, 199

S. W. 962.
16.

Danciger & Company v. P S C (1918) 275 Mo. 483, 205 S. W. 36.

The danger which the Commission was about to get itself into
would be obvious. If this was a public utility, then other residents
might demand service. How would the Commission proceed to
compel the brewing company to get a franchise from the town to
operate such a utility?
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business a public utility, secured a franchise and held himself out as
furnishing service to the public.
While these two cases do not mark the boundary of the jurisdiction they serve as guides. Presumably the Supreme Court construes the Act to apply only to those concerns which are furnishing
certain specified kinds of service to the public for profit. In most
cases there will be no difficulty, but cases may arise in which there
may be a troublesome question of fact, as to whether the concerns
in question do hold themselves out as furnishing service to the
public for profit.
The first two cases which came before the Supreme Court
which involved the then new Public Service Commission Act are
particularly important because the opinions indicated the attitude
of the court towards this new body, and the court was in a position
to either make or mar it. As stated heretofore, the control given
the Commission over the relations between the utilities and the
public was such that both parties were compelled to bring their
grievances before the Commission and submit to its order, unless
they could have such order reversed or modified by judicial review
as provided by the Act. The first case which came before the supreme court was an attempt to cut in on this exclusive jurisdiction
of the Commission by a resort to original writ of mandamus in the
Supreme Court. Had the attempt succeeded it would undoubtedly
have had a very serious effect on the Commission and its activities,
for the case arose at the very beginning of its activities, and the
exhibition of a hostile attitude by the court at that time would
have been discouraging and would probably have made the Commission too timid thereafter to be a very effective agency. In
Kansas City v. Kansas City Gas Company, 7 the city sought, by
original writ of mandamus, to compel the Kansas City Gas Company to furnish an adequate supply of gas to its customers within
the city, a matter which, among other questions, involved the
17.

(1914) 254 Mo. 515, 163 S. W. 854. The Act took effect April 15,
1913 and this opinion was handed down Feb. 10, 1914. It was the
first case involving the construction of the Act which came before
the Supreme Court.
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determination as to whether the Company was under duty to
furnish an adequate supply of gas, since it was furnishing natural
gas only, and its sources of supply were failing. The court was
asked to appoint a commissioner to take evidence and report his
conclusions to the court. But the court, while asserting its discretionary power to grant the writ of mandamus in extraordinary
cases, refused to thus cut in on the jurisdiction of tie Commission,
and held the matter was one which the city must bring before the
Commission if it desired relief. The court further expressed the
opinion that the Commission with its corps of experts was much
better fitted to deal with such questions than any commissioner the
court might appoint. 8 While up to this time the attitude of the
court had not yet been expressed judicially, yet it is not probable
it would have granted such a writ in such a case. But this court did
more than merely refuse to grant the writ. It seized on the occasion
to express clearly and forcibly its attitude towards this new agency.
The opinion was written by Judge Lamm who was one of the ablest
and most influential justices who have graced th bench of the
18.

"The complaint made and the remedy invoked in this proceeding,
taken in connection with the Public Utilities Act we have outlined, raises the question heretofore stated, viz.; Whether we should
assume jurisdiction and issue an absolute writ on this original
proceeding in thefirst instance? As to that we say:
We are of opinion that to do so would be to approach that new
and important statute with a frosty and questioning judicial
countenance.
Would be to run counter to the wise public policy evidenced
by that statute .......
Would be to assume that this court is better equipped with
ways and means to make the investigation nece, sary to any just
solution of the problem presented than is the Utilities Commission.
Would be to substitute our absolute writ of mandamus, inflexible,
unreasoning, and ill suited to compelling a general course of conduct and a "long series of continuous acts" for the flexible, sensible
and speedy remedies prescribed by the Public Utilities Act ......
We are not willing to take any such position. The commission
is better equipped with experts, technical knowledge, and other
efficient aids to a neutral and full investigation tEan would be any
commissioner appointed by the court." Kansas City v. Kansas
City Gas Co. (1914) 254 Mo. 515, 540, 163 S. W. 854.
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state, and the fact that the Act has from the start been liberally and
progressively interpreted, may be due in no small degree to the
fact that he wrote the first two opinions in which the Act was interpreted. His refreshing, forceful epigramatic style, the fame of
which has spread all over the country, gave added weight to these
two opinions.19 In the first case he said:2"
"That act is an elaborate law bottomed on the police power. It
evidences a public policy hammered out on the anvil of public discussion. It apparently recognizes certain generally accepted economic
principles and conditions, to-wit, that a public utility (like gas, water,
car service, etc ) is in its nature a monopoly; that competition is inadequate to protect the public, and, if it exists is likely to become an economic waste; that State regulation takes the place of and stands for
competition; that such regulation, to command respect from patron
or utility-owner, must be in the name of the over-lord, the State, and to
be effective must possess the power of intelligent visitation and the
plenary supervision of every business feature to be finally (however invisible) reflected in rates and quality of service. It recognizes that every
expenditure, every dereliction, every share of stock or bond or note
issued as surely reflected in rates and quality of service to the public, as
does the moisture which arises in the atmosphere finally descend in rain
upon the just and the unjust willy nilly.
That there had been a vast increase in such utilities in the last
decade or two and that evils have grown up crying out lustily for a cure
by the lawmaker, is writ large in current history. The act, then, is a
high remedial one filling a manifest want, is worthy of a hopeful future,
and on well settled legal principles is to be liberally construed to further
its life and purpose by advancing the benefits in view and retarding the
mischiefs struck at-all pro bono publico. Besides all which, the lawmaker himself has prescribed it, 'shall be liberally construed with a view
to the public welfare, efficient facilities and substantial justice between
patrons and public utilities'. ...
"He who reads that act and does not see a complete rounded scheme
for dealing with the business of public utilities at every spot where the
19.

20.

It has long been observed that a great book written in exceptionally attractive style attains far greater influence than perhaps an
equally great book written in a crabbed, unattractive style. Examples of the former are Montesquieu's Spirit of the Laws and
Sir Henry Maine's, Ancient Law. Contrast with them Austin's
Jurisprudence Determined. Even a dry matter of fact court is
not proof against an attractive and forceful literary style.
Pages 534-541.
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shoe pinches the public or the utility, reads it to little purpose. He who
reads it and does not see that the yearning of the lawmE.ker was to have
the courts trust the commission in the first instance to solve such business problems, as those presented in this case, reads it to still less purpose. We cheerfully bow to the evident intent of the lawmaker, shining
on every page of his act as expressive of the will of the people in constitutional form".
The above language coming from the court in the first case
which involved a construction of the Act, was significant as to the
court's attitude towards the Commission, and indicated the latter
was to have an opportunity to prove whether or not it could make
itself a reliable and trusted agency.
The second opinion of the court was even more significant,
and this time the case involved a serious question of construction of
the act which will be taken up more in detail subsequently. Long
prior to 1913 Missouri had passed an act fixing the maximum passenger rates for intrastate traffic at two cents per mile.' A small
intrastate railroad petitioned the Commission to have a higher rate
fixed than that permitted under the statute, whizh petition the
Commission dismissed on the ground it had only administrative
powers and could not thus amend an existing statute. The railroad
then brought mandamus in the Supreme Court to compel the
Commission to hear the matter on its merits, and again Judge
Lamm handed down one of his inimitable opinions, all the justices
concurring, in which it was held that the Commission had power
under the Act, to fix a maximum fare higher than that permitted by
the prior statute in question. 2 In this opinion the court per Judge
2
Lamm again took a liberal view and said: "
21.

22.

23.

R. S. 1919 s. 10047. This act was passed in 1907. The Public
Service Commission Act did not mention it nor did the Act expressly confer any power on the Commission to grant a higher rate
than provided by this statute.
Missouri Southern Railway v. P S C (1914) 259 Mo. 704, 168 S. W.
1156. This opinion was handed down July 2, 114, five months
after that in Kansas City v. Kansas City Gas Co., supra. This was

the second time that the construction of the Act had come before
the court.
Pages 713-714.
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"It was declared in that case (Kansas City v. Kansas City Gas
Company, supra) that the proper judicial attitude toward the statute
was not a frosty or questioning one-contra, it was an attitude running
on all fours with the wise public policy evidenced by it. It is, I think,
in the dry light of such doctrine the problem presented to us in the
instant case must be solved."
"When the ground on which a new judgment is to rest is new and
unexplored, as here, it is well enough for courts to sound at every
step and look to the past as well as the future to get the right point of
view and to see if, peradventure, the ground is solid; but after that has
been said and everything else has been said that well can be said on the
wisdom of judicial caution and circumspection where the situation is
new, it should be allowed as a good and acceptable doctrine that the
courts should not adhere to theories, however fond and familiar, when
the lawmaker (within constitutional limitations) has exploded them by a
new statute. Indeed in that behalf it is much the same as a philosopher
has said of custom: "A forward retention of custom is as turbulent a
thing as an innovation, and they that reverence too much old times are
but a scorn to the new" (Bacon-of Innovations). It is a lovely poetical
concept and likewise a comfortable and wholesome judicial concept that:
'The thoughts of men are widened with the process of the sun'.
As will appear hereafter when this case is taken up again, a
strong argument can be made on the other side, an argument which
probably would have appealed to a Missouri court of a generation
ago as unanswerable. Portions of these two opinions have subse-

quently been quoted by the court as expressing the spirit which
ought to be observed in dealing with the Act.24

(To Be Continued.)
24.

See P S C v. Missouri Southern Railway (1919) 279 Mo. 455, 464-6,
214 S. W. 381; City Water Company v. Sedalia (1921) 288 Mo. 411,

419-20, 231 S. W. 942; Rhodes v. P S C (1917) 270 Mo. 547, 558563, 194 S.W. 287.

